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In this paper we study the cooperative theory of stable outcomes for the room-
mates problem modeled as a contract choice problem. We show, that a simple 
generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms proposing due to 
Gale and Shapley (1962), yields outcomes for a two-sided contract choice 
problem, which necessarily belong to the core and are Weakly Pareto Optimal for 
firms. Under additional assumptions : (a) given any two distinct workers, the set 
of yields achievable by a firm with the first worker is disjoint from the set of 
yields achievable by it with the second, and (b) the contract choice problem is 
pair-wise efficient, we prove that there is no stable outcome at which a firm can 
get more than what it gets at the unique outcome of our procedure. 
 
 
1. Introduction :  
We consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each 
coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. 
We call such problems, contract choice problems. The economic motivation 
behind the problem, arises from several real world "commons problems", where 
agents can pool their initial resources and produce a marketable surplus, which 
needs to be shared among themselves.  
There are clearly, two distinct problems that arise out of such real world 
possibilities: (i) Coalition Formation: Which are the disjoint coalitions that will 
form in order to pool in their resources? (ii) Distribution: How will a coalition 
distribute the surplus within itself? While, the possibility of an aggregate amount 
of surplus being generated by a coalition is fairly common, there are many 
situations where more than one aggregate surplus results from a cooperative 
activity, and the distribution of the surplus depends on the particular aggregate 
that a coalition chooses to share.  
For instance, when a firm employs a worker, it is possible that the revenue 
generated by the firm depends on whether the worker puts in high or low effort, 
where high effort corresponds to working full time and low effort corresponds to 
working half time. The sharing of the surplus between the firm and the worker as 
well as the amount of the surplus itself, can then depend on the effort put in by the 
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worker and the contingent contract that the firm offers. However, since low effort 
by the worker, requires more intensive use of the firm's technical capabilities 
which the firm needs to compensate, the firm would in such a situation retain a 
greater proportion of the surplus. As an example, consider a situation where a 
high effort by the worker allows him 60% of the surplus, whereas a low effort 
allows him only 30%. If high effort by the worker yields a surplus of dollar 100, 
and low effort yields a surplus of dollar 90, then with high effort, the firm retains 
dollar 40 and the worker gets dollar 60, whereas with low effort the firm retains 
dollar 63 and the worker gets dollar 27.  
In our model each non-empty subset of agents has a non-empty finite set of pay-
off vectors to choose from. An outcome comprises a partition of the set of agents, 
and an assignment for each coalition in the partition a feasible pay-off vector. Our 
model is therefore a special kind of cooperative game with non-transferable 
utility. A stable outcome is an outcome that is not blocked by any coalition, i.e. an 
outcome that no coalition can improve upon. Thus, the set of stable outcomes 
corresponds to the core of the corresponding cooperative game. 
A salient feature of many markets is to match one agent with another. This is 
particularly true, in the case of assigning workers to firms. Such markets are 
usually studied with the help of  “two sided matching markets” introduced by 
Gale and Shapley (1962). However, not all matching problems where disjoint 
pairs are required to form, are dichotomous. For instance in a doubles version of a 
tennis tournament, pairs are formed from a given pool of players, without any 
obvious dichotomy existing within the pool. The problem of forming disjoint 
pairs out of a given set of agents is what Gale and Shapley(1962) called a room-
mates problem. A room-mates problem corresponds to the formation of 
partnerships between pairs of agents as is observed for instance in the case of 
firms providing legal or accounting services. The two-sided matching market of 
Gale and Shapley (1962) (with one side of the market comprising workers and the 
other side comprising firms), is indeed a special case of the room-mates problem.   
The solution concept proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962), called a stable 
matching, requires that there should not exist two agents, who prefer each other, 
to the individual they have been paired with. It was shown in Gale and Shapley 
(1962), in a framework where every agent has preference defined by a linear order 
over the entire set of agents, that a room-mates problem may not admit any stable 
matching although a two-sided matching market always does. Indeed, given a 
two-sided matching market, there is always a stable matching which no firm 
considers inferior to any other stable matching, and there is always a stable 
matching that no worker considers inferior to any other stable matching. An 
overview of the considerable literature on two-sided matching markets that has 
evolved out of the work of Gale and Shapley (1962), is available in Roth and 
Sotomayor (1990).  
In this paper, we represent a generalization of the room-mates problem as a 
contract choice problem, where the coalition structure in any outcome comprises 
either one or two element sets. The first significant result that we present here is a 
strengthening of a result originally due to Knuth (1976). The original result said 
that given any two stable matchings for a two-sided contract choice problem, if no 
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firm prefers the first matching to the second, then no worker prefers the second 
matching to the first. In our framework of a room-mates problem represented as a 
contract choice problem we show the following:  
Given two outcomes for a room-mates problem of which say the second is 
stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) every agent in S 
prefers the second outcome to the first, and (b) no agent in S and his room-
mate under the second matching prefer each other to their respective room-
mates in the first matching, then no room-mate of an agent in S prefers the 
second matching to the first. 
A particular instance of a generalized room-mates problem is a two-sided contract 
choice problem, which however is a generalization of the model due to Eriksson 
and Karlander (1998). We allow each pair of agents a non-empty finite set of real 
valued divisions of a good to choose from. Each agent is assumed to prefer more 
of the good to less of it. Further, the set of agents are divided into two disjoint 
sets, with one set being the set of firms and the other the set of workers, with no 
pair of agents on the same side of the market being able to obtain an allocation 
which is at least as good as an allocation that could be obtained by them 
remaining single or by forming a pair with a member on the other side of the 
market. If each pair of agents is provided singletons to choose from, then we have 
the two-sided matching market of Gale and Shapley (1962).  
We show here, that a two-sided contract choice problem invariably admits a non-
empty core. A simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with 
firms making offers due to Gale and Shapley (1962), yields outcomes for the two-
sided contract choice problem, which necessarily belong to the core. The main 
difference between the procedure we define and the Deferred Acceptance 
Procedure, is that a firm can make offers to the same worker several times.  
We also show, that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for 
Firms, i.e. there is no other outcome which all firms prefer to an outcome of this 
procedure. This result is an extension to our framework, of a similar result due to 
Roth and Sotomayor (1990). Under the additional assumptions: (a) given any two 
distinct workers, the set of yields achievable by a firm with the first worker is 
disjoint from the set of yields achievable by it with the second, and (b) the 
contract choice problem is pair-wise efficient, we prove that the procedure has a 
unique outcome. Further, there is no stable outcome at which a firm can get more 
than what it gets at this unique outcome.  
As in Sotomayor (1996), it is possible to provide a non-constructive proof of the 
existence of a stable outcome, in the framework of a two-sided contract choice 
problem. Such a proof is essentially non-algorithmic although as Sotomayor 
(1996) shows, is much simpler than its procedural counterpart. A consequence of 
such a proof is the absence of an explicit "design" for a stable outcome. 
 
 
2. The Model : Let X be a non-empty finite subset of ℵ(: the set of natural 
numbers), denoting the set of agents. We assume that each agent prefers more 
money to less. 
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Let ℜ denote the set of all real numbers and ℜ+ the set of non-negative real 
numbers. Let [X] denote the set of all non-empty subsets of X. Members of [X] 
are called coalitions. Given S∈[X], let ℜS denote the set of all functions from S to 
ℜ and [ℜS] denote the set of all non-empty finite subsets of ℜS. 
A Contract Choice Problem (CCP) is a function G: [X] → ∪{φ}, such 






S; (b) for all a∈X: G({a}) = {0}. 
For S∈[X], G(S) is the set of all feasible allocations of money for agents in S. If 
G(S) is empty then the set of feasible allocations for S is empty. Hence such a 
coalition S cannot materialize. 
A CCP G is said to be super-additive if for all S,T∈[X], with S∩T = φ : [x∈G(S), 
y∈G(T) and G(S∪T) ≠φ ] implies [z∈G(S∪T), where z(a) = x(a) for all a∈S and 
z(a) = y(a) for all y∈T].  
Given a CCP G, a coalition structure for G is a partition of X. 
A pay-off function is a function v : X → ℜ+. If v is a pay-off function and S∈[X], 
then v|S denotes the restriction of v to the set S.  
An outcome for a CCP G is a pair (h, v), where h is a coalition structure for G and 
v is a pay-off function such that (i) for all a∈X: v(a) ≥ 0; (ii) for all S∈h: v|S∈ 
G(S). 
The pair (h, v), where h = {{a}/ a∈X} and v(a) = 0 for all a∈X, is an outcome for 
every CCP. Hence the set of outcomes is always non-empty. 
 
A special case of a CCP is a generalization of the room-mates problem of Gale 
and Shapley (1962), where G(S) = φ, whenever #S > 2. We call such problems 
generalized room-mates problems. 
Given a coalition structure h for a generalized room-mates problem G, we can 
define one to one function µ:X→ X, such that for all a∈X: {a, µ(a)} ∈h. µ is 
called the matching associated with h and satisfies the property [for all a∈X: 
µ(µ(a)) = a]. 
Let Y = {S∈[X]/ #S = 2} i.e. coalitions of size two. 
Given an outcome (h, v) for a generalized room-mates problem G, a coalition 
S∈Y is said to block (h, v) if there exists x ∈G(S): x(a) > v(a) for all a∈S.  
An outcome (h, v) for a generalized room-mates problem G  is said to belong to 
the core of G, if it does not admit any blocking coalition. Let Core(G) denote the 
set of outcomes in the core of G. An outcome in Core(G) is said to be a 
stable(stable outcome) for(of) G. 
  
 The following example due to Gale and Shapley (1962) shows that the core of a 
generalized room-mates problem may be empty. 
 
Example 1 (Gale Shapley (1962)) : Let X = {1,2,3,4}. For a∈X, let ua: X→ℜ be 
defined as follows: 
u1: u1(2) = 3, u1(3) = 2, u1(4) = 1, u1(1) = 0; 
u2: u2(3) = 3, u2(1) = 2, u2(4) = 1, u2(2) = 0; 
u3: u3(1) = 3, u3(2) = 2, u3(4) = 1, u3(3) = 0; 
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u4: u4(1) = 3, u4(2) = 2, u4(3) = 1, u4(4) = 0. 
 
ua(b) is the worth to agent a of forming a coalition/ partnership with agent b.  
Let, G be the generalized room-mates problem such that for all S∈[X]: (i)G(S) = 
{x∈ℜS/ either [x(a) = ua(b) and x(b) = ub(a)] or [x(a) = ua(a) and x(b) = ub(b)]} if 
S = {a,b}, a,b∈ X; (ii) G(S) = φ if #S>2. 
Thus, for coalitions S = {a,b} of size 2, the feasible yields comprise the one that 
result from the two agents in the coalition actively collaborating [x(a) = ua(b) and 
x(b) = ub(a)] as well as the one that results when they decide to remain single 
[x(a) = ua(a) and x(b) = ub(b)]. The latter yield vector has been included in order 
to obtain a super-additive generalized room-mates problem, and could be easily 
omitted without affecting any of our conclusions.  
Suppose (h,v) is an outcome such that v(4) ≠ 0. If v(4) = 1, then {3,4}∈h  and 
v(3) = 1. Thus,{2,3} blocks (h,v), since 2 can get 3 units and 3 can get 2 units in 
G({2,3}); if v(4) = 2, then {2,4}∈h and v(2) = 1. Thus, {1,2} blocks (h,v) since 1 
can get 3 units and 2 can get 2 units in G({1,2}); if v(4) = 3, then {1,4}∈h and 
v(1) = 1. Thus, {1,3} blocks (h,v) since 3 can get 3 units and 1 can get 2 units in 
G({1,3}). Thus, v(4) ≠ 0 implies (h,v) does not belong to Core(G). Hence suppose 
v(4) = 0. If v(3) = 0, then both {2,3} and {3,4} block (h,v); if v(2) = 0, then both 
{1,2}and {2,4} block (h,v); if v(1) = 0, then both {1,3} and {1,4} block (h,v). 
Since v(4) = 0 requires v(a) = a for at least one a∈{1,2,3}, Core(G) = φ.  
It is worth observing that G is a super-additive CCP, since G(S) = φ if #S > 2 . 
 
 
3. Properties of Stable Outcomes for Room-mates Problems: 
 
Lemma 1: Let (h,v) and (h',v') be stable outcomes for a generalized room-mates 
problem G. Let {a,b}∈h and b ≠ a. If v(a) > v'(a), then v'(b) > v(b). 
 
Proof: Suppose (h,v), (h',v'), a and b are as above. If v(a) > v'(a), then the stability 
of (h',v') requires v'(b) ≥ v(b). Q.E.D. 
 
The following lemma extends one due to Knuth (1976): 
 
Lemma 2: Let G be a generalized room-mates problem for which (h',v') is a stable 
outcome. Let S be a non-empty subset of X. Suppose that (h,v) is an outcome 
such that v'(a) > v(a) for all a∈S. If there does not exist a ∈S, such that {a,b}∈h' 
blocks (h,v), then v(b) ≥ v'(b) whenever b∈µ'(S), where µ' is the matching 
associated with h'. 
 
Proof: Suppose that (h,v) is an outcome such that v'(a) > v(a) for all a∈S, and 
there does not exist a ∈S, such that {a,b}∈h' blocks (h,v). Towards a 
contradiction that for some {a,b}∈h' with a∈S, we have v'(b) > v(b). Then since 
v'(a) > v(a), it turns out that {a,b} blocks (h,v) contrary to hypothesis. This proves 
the lemma. Q.E.D. 
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Hence if in Lemma 2, (h,v) is a stable matching, then v'(a) > v(a) for all a∈S 
implies [v(b) ≥ v'(b) for all b∈µ'(S)], where µ' is the matching associated with h'. 
 
4.         Existence of Stable Outcomes for a two-sided contract choice problem: 
 
Let F and W be two non-empty disjoint subsets of X such that F ∪W = X. F is a 
set of firms and W is a set of workers. 
A room-mates problem G is said to be a two-sided contract choice problem if for 
all f,f'∈F and w,w'∈W with f ≠ f' and w ≠ w': G({f,f'}) = G({w,w'}) = φ.  
If (h,v) is an outcome for a two-sided contract choice problem, then S∈h implies 
#S ∈{1,2}. Further, if #S = 2, then S∩F ≠ φ and S∩W ≠ φ. 
In this section we shall denote an outcome (h,v) of a two-sided contract choice 
problem G  by (µ,v), where µ is the matching associated with h. Clearly for all 
f∈F, µ(f) ∈ W∪{f} and for all w∈W, µ(w) ∈ F∪{w}. 
 
Theorem 1: Every two-sided contract choice problem admits a stable outcome. 
 
Proof: Let G be a given two-sided contract choice problem, and let f∈F and 
w∈W. Let W*(f) = ×G({f,w'}) ∪{(f, 0)} and F*(w) = × 









f has preferences defined by a binary relation ≥f over  W*(f) satisfying the 
following property: for all (a,x), (b, x') ∈ W*(f): (a, x) ≥f (b, x') if and only if x(f) 
≥ x'(f). Similarly, w has preferences defined by a binary relation ≥w over  F*(w) 
satisfying the following property: for all (a, x), (b, x') ∈ F*(w) : (a, x) ≥w (b, x') if 
and only if x(w) ≥ x'(w). 
Let >f denote the asymmetric part of  ≥f  and >w denote the asymmetric part of  ≥w  
Let W**(f) = {(w',x)∈W*(f)/ (w',x) >f (f,0)} and F**(w) = {(f',x)∈F*(w)/ (f',x) 
>w (w,0)}. 
Given f ∈F and an element A of W**(f), let A|W = w', where (w', x) = A. Given 
w∈W and an element A of F**(w), let A|F = f', where (f', x) = A. Given a subset S 
of ∪ , f∈F and w∈W, let U(f, S) = {(a, x')∈S ∩W*(f) / 









f (a, x')} and U(w,S) = {(a, x')∈S∩ F*(w)/ 
there does not exist ( b, x'')∈S: (b,x'') >w (a , x')}. 
Let F1 = {f∈F/ W**(f)  ≠φ}. For f∈F1, let P1(f) ∈ U(f, W**(f)) where (w,x) = 
P1(f) implies f proposes to w the division in G({f,w}) where f gets x(f) and w gets 
x(w). Each f∈F1 proposes to the worker P1(f)|W. For w∈{P1(f)/ f∈F1}, let R1(w) = 
{(f, x) / (w, x)= P1(f)}, R (w) = R1+
1(w)∩F**(w) and E1(w) be any element of  
U(w, (w)). Each w receiving a proposal, rejects all proposals in R1R +
1(w) \ 
{E1(w)}. The proposal E1(w) is kept attached by w. Only those firms who are not 
kept attached at this step, are allowed to propose at the subsequent stage. 
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Suppose that the procedure continues to a stage 'k', k ≥ 1, with Fk, Pk(f) for f∈Fk, 
Rk(w), Rk+(w) and Ek(w) for w∈ {Pk(f)/ f∈Fk}having been defined. The 
procedure stops if Fk+1 = {f∈F1/ all the proposals made by 'f' at the previous step 







k+1 ≠ φ, then for f∈Fk+1, let 






k+1 proposes to the worker in Pk+1(f)| W. 
If  (w,x) = Pk+1(f), then f  proposes to w the division where f gets x(f) and w gets 




k+1(w) = {(f, x) / (w, x) = Pk+1(f)} and 
(w) = R1kR ++
kR +
k+1(w) ∩F**(w). Let Ek+1(w) be any element of U(w, Ek(w) 
∪ (w)). The proposal E1+ k+1(w) is kept attached by w at this step. The 
remaining proposals in {Ek(w)} ∪Rk+1(w) are rejected. 
Since F∪W is finite, there exists a stage K when FK = φ. At this stage every 
f∈F1 is either attached to some worker or has been rejected by every worker in 
W**(f). Further, every worker w ∈W for whom F**(w) ≠ φ  has either not 
received any proposal or is attached to a firm. 
Define an outcome (µ, v) as follows: for all a∈{f∈F/ W**(f) = φ}∪ {w∈W/ 
F**(w) = φ}, let µ(a) = a and v(a) = 0. For all w∈W, who never received a 
proposal or rejected each and every that she received, let µ(w) = w and v(w) = 0. 
For all f∈F, who have been rejected by every worker it has proposed to let µ(f) = 
f and v(f) = 0. The remaining workers are the ones who are attached at stage K. If 
EK(w) = (f, x), then let (µ(w), v(w)) = (f, x(w)) and (µ(f), v(f)) = (w, x(f)). 
Suppose there exists a pair (f,w) ∈F×W such that (f,w) blocks (µ, v). Thus, there 
exists x∈G({f,w}) such that x(f) > v(f) and x(w) > v(w). Thus, (w, x) >f (µ(f), 
(v(f), v(µ(f)))). Thus, f must have proposed (w, x) to w and was rejected by w in 
favor of some other proposal before it proposed (µ(f), (v(f), v(µ(f)))) to µ(f). 
Since ≥w is transitive, it must be the case that (µ(w), (v(w), v(µ(w)))) ≥w (f, x)). 
This contradicts x(w) > v(w) and proves the theorem. Q.E.D. 
 
Let O be the set of outcomes of the procedure defined in the proof of Theorem 1. 
Clearly O though non-empty and finite can admit more than one element.  
An immediate consequence of the procedure, used in the proof of Theorem 1, is 
the following result. 
 
Proposition 1: Weak Pareto Optimality for Firms: Let (µ*, v*)∈ O. Then, there 
does not exist any outcome which every firm prefers to (µ*, v*). 
  
Proof: If # F > # W, then there is no way in which the proposition can be falsified, 
since in every matching some firm must be without a worker. On the other hand, 
every worker who is single at (µ*, v*), continues to remain so at any other 
matching, where all firms are better off. This is because, according to the 
procedure defined in Theorem 1, a worker who is single, either rejected all the 
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proposals she received preferring to remain single, or every firm considers its 
outcome at (µ*, v*) to be at least as good as any allocation that is feasible when it 
is paired with this worker. Hence, we can assume that µ* maps F onto W, and in 
particular #F = # W. 
Towards a contradiction suppose there is an outcome (µ, v) such that v(f) > v*(f) 
for all f∈F. This in particular implies that µ maps F onto W. Let f* be the firm 
whose proposal was accepted at the last stage of the procedure defined in 
Theorem 1. Let w* be the worker who accepted its offer. If (w*, v(f*), v(w*)) 
was the only offer that w* had received, then (w*, v(f), v(w*)) could not have 
been preferred to (µ*(f), v(f), v(µ*(f))) by any f ≠f*. Thus, there could be no firm 
to whom (w*, v(f), v(w*)) could be assigned under (µ,v) leading to an 
improvement for it over (µ*, v*). Thus, there must have been some other proposal 
(w*, x) made by an f ≠ f*, which was rejected by w* in favor of (f*, v(w*), v(f*)). 
Hence, f is assigned no worker under the µ*, contradicting that µ* maps F onto 
W. This proves the proposition. Q.E.D. 
 
The implication of Proposition 1 is that given any stable outcome in O, there is no 
outcome that all firms prefer to the former. However, there may exist outcomes 
(in fact stable outcomes!), where some firms are better off than at the earlier 
stable outcome, while others obtain the same pay-off as in the former. This 
possibility is observed in an illustration that we provide after an observation 
following Proposition 2. 
 
A generalized two-sided matching problem G is said to be pair-wise efficient, if 
for all (f,w)∈F×W and x, x' ∈G({f,w}): [x(f) > x'(f)] if and only if [x(w) < x'(w)]. 
 
Note: If G is a two-sided contract choice problem satisfying pair-wise efficiency 
then given any two stable outcomes (µ, v) and (µ', v') for G: [v'(f) ≥ v(f) for all 
f∈F] implies [[v(w) ≥ v'w) for all w∈W]. For if v'(w) > v(w) for some w∈W, then 
µ'(w) ∈F and by Lemma 2, v(µ'(w)) ≥ v'(µ'(w)). Thus, v(µ'(w)) = v'(µ'(w)), 
contradicting pair-wise efficiency. 
  
Another consequence of the procedure used to prove Theorem 1, is the following: 
 
Proposition 2: Existence of Optimal Stable Outcome for Firms : Suppose G is 
efficient and that for all f∈F and w,w'∈W with w≠ w':{x(f)/ x∈ 
G({f,w})}∩{x(f)/x∈G({f,w'})} = φ. Let (µ*, v*)∈ O. Then, O is singleton and 
given any stable outcome (µ, v): v*(f) ≥ v(f) for all f∈F. 
 
Proof: Suppose that at the first step of the procedure, a firm f has a proposal 
(w,v(f),v(w)) rejected by a worker w = µ(f). Since, worker w, proceeds up her 
ranking during the procedure, w rejects (w,v(w)) of f in favor of some other 
proposal (w,x) made by some other firm f'. Thus, x(w) > v(w). Since, f' made the 
offer to w at the very first step, x(f') ≥ v(f'). Now, x ∈G({f',w}) and x(f') = v(f') 
implies by our assumption on G that µ(f') = w. This combined with x, (x(f'),v(w)) 
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∈G({f',w}) and x(w) > v(w), contradicts the pair-wise efficiency of G. Thus, x(f') 
> v(f') and x(w) > v(w) contradicting the stability of (µ,v). 
Suppose that up to a certain stage in the procedure, no firm f has a proposal 
(w,v(f),v(w)) rejected by a worker w = µ(f). Suppose that at the next stage of the 
procedure, a firm f has a proposal (w,v(f),v(w)) rejected by a worker w = µ(f) in 
favor of another proposal (w,x) by another firm f'. Thus, x(w) > v(w). By the 
induction hypothesis, f'' has not had (µ(f' ), v(f'), v(µ(f' )) by µ(f' ) up to the stage, 
where it makes the offer to w in the procedure. Since, f' moves one rank down at a 
time in the procedure, x ≥ v(f'). Now, x ∈G({f',w}) and x(f') = v(f') implies by our 
assumption on G that µ(f') = w. This combined with x, (x(f'),v(w)) ∈G({f',w}) 
and x(w) > v(w), contradicts the pair-wise efficiency of G. Thus, x(f') > v(f') and 
x(w) > v(w) contradicting the stability of (µ,v). Thus, even at this stage of the 
procedure, no firm f has a proposal (w,v(f),v(w)) rejected by a worker w = µ(f). 
Since the procedure terminates in a finite number of steps, it must be the case that 
v*(f) ≥ v(f) for all f∈F. 
Suppose (µ, v) and (µ', v') ∈ O. Thus, v(f) = v'(f) for all f∈F. If for some f∈F, µ(f) 
≠ µ'(f), then {x(f)/ x∈ G({f,µ(f)})}∩{x(f)/x∈G({f,µ'(f)})} ≠ φ, contradicting our 
requirement on G. Thus, µ(f) = µ'(f). By pair-wise efficiency of G, v(µ(f)) = 
v'(µ'(f)). Thus, O is singleton. Q.E.D. 
 
Note: G({f,w})∩G({f,w'}) = φ implies {x(f)/ x∈ G({f,w})}∩{x(f)/x∈G({f,w'})} 
= φ. Thus, the consequences of Proposition 2 would continue to be valid if for all 
f∈F and w,w'∈W with w≠ w': G({f,w})∩G({f,w'}) = φ. 
 
The implication of Proposition 2 is the following: Suppose, a two-sided contract 
choice problem is pair-wise efficient and is such that the set of yields that a firm 
can achieve with any worker is disjoint from the set of yields it can achieve with 
any other. Then there exists a stable outcome that is no worse for any firm 
compared to the unique stable outcome in O.  
 
Observation: If (µ,v) is any stable outcome for a two-sided contract choice 
problem G satisfying the conditions of Proposition 2, then the set of firms that 
employ workers at (µ,v) (: {f∈F/ v(f) > 0}) is a subset of the set of firms that 
employ workers at (µ*,v*) (: {f∈F/ v*(f) > 0}). By the note preceding Lemma 2, 
and the fact that v*(f) ≥ v(f) for all f∈F we have v(w) ≥ v*(w) for all w∈W. Thus, 
the set of workers who are employed at (µ*,v*) (: {w∈F/ v*(w) > 0}) is a subset 
of the set of workers who are employed at (µ,v) (: {w∈F/ v*(w) > 0}). The 
number of workers who are employed at any stable outcome is equal to the 
number of firms that employ them. Thus, the set of firms that employ workers is 
the same for both stable outcomes and the set of workers who are employed are 
also the same for both stable outcomes. Hence, given any two stable outcomes the 
set of firms that employ workers and the set of workers who are employed are 
both invariant.  
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As an illustration of the procedure used in the proof of Theorem 1, consider the 
situation where X = {1,2,3,4}, F = {1,2} and W = {3,4}. Let G be a two-sided 
contract choice problem defined thus: 
G({1,3}) = {(x(1),x(3))/ (x(1),x(3)) = (3,1) or (x(1),x(3)) = (1,3)} 
G({1,4}) = {(x(1),x(4))/ (x(1),x(4)) = (4,1) or (x(1),x(4)) = (1,4)} 
G({2,3}) = {(x(2),x(3))/ (x(2),x(3)) = (3,2) or (x(2),x(3)) = (2,3)} 
G({2,4}) = {(x(2),x(4))/ (x(2),x(4)) = (4,2) or (x(2),x(4)) = (2,4)}. 
 
To begin with firm 1 proposes to worker 4, the division (x(1),x(4)) = (4,1) and 
firm 2 proposes to the worker 4, the division (x(2),x(4)) = (4,2). At this stage 
worker 3 has not received any offer. Worker 4, rejects the offer made by firm 1 
since firm 2's offer is more attractive to worker 4. Worker 4, keeps firm 2's offer 
attached. At this stage firm 1 can either propose (x(1),x(3)) = (3,1) or (x(1),x(3)) 
= (1,3) to worker 3 or propose (x(1),x(3)) = (1,4) to worker 4. Of the three the 
most attractive offer to firm 1 is (x(1),x(3)) = (3,1), which firm 1 proposes to 
worker 3. In the absence of any competing offers, worker 3 keeps firm 1's offer 
attached. Since both firms and both workers are attached the matching µ where 
µ(1) = 3, µ(2) = 4 and the pay-off function v where v(1) = 3, v(2) = 4, v(3) = 1 
and v(4) = 2 are defined. It is easily verified that (µ,v) is a stable outcome. 
Further, since firm 2, gets its highest possible pay-off, the outcome is Weakly 
Pareto Optimal for firms. It is worth noting that this is the only possible stable 
outcome for G. Since firm 2 gets its highest possible pay-off, it would never be a 
party to a blocking coalition. If {1,4} were to form blocking coalition then in 
order to give worker 4 more than v(4) = 2, firm 1 would have to settle for the pay-
off of one unit which is less than v(1) = 3. Further, since every one gets a positive 
pay-off, none would prefer to remain single. Hence, the conclusions of 
Proposition 2 are (trivially!) verified. 
However, if G({1,4}) = {(x(1),x(4))/ (x(1),x(4)) = (4,1) or (x(1),x(4)) = (3,3)}, 
while G satisfies pair-wise efficiency it fails to satisfy the condition that f∈F and 
w,w'∈W with w≠ w':{x(f)/ x∈ G({f,w})}∩{x(f)/x∈G({f,w'})} = φ, since 
3∈{x(1)/ x∈ G({1,3})}∩{x(1)/x∈G({1,4})}. Now, after being rejected by worker 
4, firm 1 could either proceed as before or propose (x(1),x(4)) = (3,3) to worker 4. 
In either case the pay-off to firm 1 is 3. In the latter situation worker 4, would 
reject the earlier offer and get attached to this new offer made by firm 1. The 
rejected firm 2, would now choose its best possible offer i.e. (x(2),x(3)) = (3,2) 
and propose it to worker 3. Worker 3 would get attached to this offer. Since both 
firms and both workers are attached the matching µ' where µ'(1) = 4, µ'(2) = 3 and 
the pay-off function v where v(1) = 3, v(2) = 3, v(3) = 2 and v(4) = 3 are defined. 
Since both the firms get 3 units each, and since it is impossible for both firms to 
get 4 units each, he outcome is Weakly Pareto Optimal for firms. Further neither 
{4,2} nor {1,3} is a blocking coalition for (µ',v'). Hence (µ',v') is a stable 
outcome. Further, (µ,v) as defined earlier, continues to be a stable outcome:  
(a) since firm 2 gets its highest possible pay-off, it would never be a party to a 
blocking coalition;  
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(b) if {1,4} were to form blocking coalition then in order to give worker 4 more 
than v(4) = 2, firm 1 would have to settle for the pay-off of three units which 
is no better than v(1) = 3. 
It is easily observed that all the conclusions of Proposition 2 are violated.  
 
 
5. Conclusion:  
The main contribution of this paper is an extension of the classical two-sided 
matching market of Gale and Shapley (1962), now viewed as a two-sided contract 
choice problem. In this framework, we are able to prove that a stable outcome 
always exists. In the particular case where a two-sided contract choice problem 
reduces to a two-sided matching market, the procedure that we used to prove 
Theorem 1 reduces to the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms making 
offers (Gale and Shapley (1962)):  
To start each firm makes an offer to its favorite worker, i.e. to its first worker on 
its list of acceptable workers. Each worker rejects the offer of any firm who is 
unacceptable to him, and each worker who receives one or more acceptable 
offers, rejects all but his most preferred of these. Any firm whose offer is not 
rejected at this point is kept “pending”. 
At any step any firm whose offer was rejected at the previous step, makes an offer 
to its next choice (i.e., to its most preferred acceptable worker, among those who 
have not rejected its offer), so long as there remains an acceptable worker to 
whom it has not yet made an offer. If at any step of the procedure, a firm has 
already made offers to, and been rejected by all workers it finds acceptable, then it 
makes no further offers. Each worker receiving offers rejects any from 
unacceptable firms, and also rejects all but his most preferred among the group 
consisting of the new offers together with any firm that he may have kept pending 
from the previous step. 
The algorithm stops after any step in which no firm is rejected. At this point, 
every firm is either kept pending by some worker or has been rejected by every 
worker on its list of acceptable workers. The matching that is defined now, 
associates to each firm the worker who has kept him pending, if there be any. 
Further, workers who did not receive any offers at all and firms who have been 
rejected by all the workers on their list of acceptable workers, remain single. 
In the above procedure, each firm, proceeds down its list of acceptable workers, 
and each worker proceeds up his list of acceptable firms. 
Two major results that are available in the literature follow as a direct 
consequence of the deferred acceptance procedure. The first concerns the Weak 
Pareto Optimality of the matching defined by the procedure. Our Proposition 1 is 
an unconditional extension of that result to two-sided contract choice problems. 
The second result states that there is no other stable matching which a firm prefers 
to the one defined by the deferred acceptance procedure. Considering that a 
classical two-sided matching market satisfies pair-wise efficiency as well as the 
requirement that the set of yields that a firm can achieve with any worker is 
disjoint from the set of yields it can achieve with any other, Proposition 2 extends 
this result to the context of two-sided contract choice problems. A consequence of 
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the two assumptions invoked for Proposition 2 is that the outcome of the 
procedure we define is unique. Hence, we arrive at the following stronger version 
of the existence result of a firm optimal stable matching for two-sided matching 
market (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)): 
Suppose a two-sided contract choice problem satisfies pair-wise efficiency and is 
such that the set of yields that a firm can achieve with any worker is disjoint from 
the set of yields it can achieve with any other. Then there exists a stable outcome 
that is no worse than any other stable outcome for any firm. 
A major consequence of our analysis is the added flexibility that negotiation 
procedures in a labor market enjoy while conforming to the requirements for the 
existence of a stable outcome.  
As markets and institutions evolve, newer opportunities become available on 
either side of a transaction thereby providing greater scope for designing more 
innovative contracts between firms and workers. Thus, with the passage of time 
the framework of two-sided contract choice problems is likely to prove more 
instrumental for the study and analysis of labor markets than its classical 
predecessor. 
 
Acknowledgment: This paper is a revised version of an earlier working paper, 
Lahiri (2003). An earlier version of this paper was presented on January 9, 2004, 
at ICOR 2004, held at Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India. I would like to 
thank Professor William Wallace for drawing my attention to a possible link 





1.   K. Eriksson, and J. Karlander (1998): "Stable matching in a common 
generalization of the marriage and assignment models", 
arXiv:math.CO?9801096v1 21 Jan 1998. 
2.   D. Gale and L. Shapley (1962) : “ College Admissions and the stability 
of Marriage”, American Mathematical Monthly, Volume 69, pages 9 – 
15. 
3.   D. Gale and M. Sotomayor (1985 a) : “ Some Remarks on the Stable  
Matching Problem”, Discrete Applied Mathematics, Volume 11, 
pages 223 – 232.  
4.    D. Knuth (1976) : “Marriages Stables”, Montreal : Les Presses de 
l’Universite de Montreal. 
5. S. Lahiri (2003):"Stable Matchings for a Generalized Marriage 
Problem", Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Working Paper No: 
117.03 (Series: CTN- Coalition Theory Network). 
6. A. Roth and M. Sotomayor (1990) : “ Two – Sided Matching: A Study 
in Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis”, Econometric Society 
Monograph No : 18, Cambridge University Press.  
 12 
 13 
7. M. Sotomayor (1996): " A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the 
Existence of Stable Marriages", Games and Economic Behavior 13, 
135- 137. 
 
